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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Mentholated tobacco products apparently pose greater 
health risks than non-mentholated ones. Plaintif fs, a group 
of African-Americans, brought a civil rights action, 
contending that, with this knowledge, defendant tobacco 
companies have targeted the marketing of mentholated 
tobacco products at African-Americans. 
 
Plaintiffs, who designate themselves the "Black Smokers," 
are the Rev. Jesse Brown, the Uptown Coalition for Tobacco 
Control and Healing, Aaron Eleazar , Pansy Smith, Ellen 
Irving, and the National Association of African Americans 
for Positive Imagery, Inc. They brought this civil rights 
action on behalf of a class of all living Black Americans who 
have, since 1954, purchased or consumed mentholated 
 
                                4 
  
tobacco products. They named as defendants the tobacco 
companies: Philip Morris, Inc., R.J. Reynolds T obacco 
Company, RJR Nabisco Holdings Corporation, Br own & 
Williamson Tobacco Corporation, B.A.T . Industries, the 
American Tobacco Company, Lorillard T obacco Company, 
Inc., Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, Liggett Group Inc. 
and United States Tobacco Company; the non-pr ofit 
organizations supported by the tobacco-industry: the 
Tobacco Institute, Inc., the Council for T obacco Research -- 
U.S.A., Inc., and Smokeless Tobacco Council, Inc.; and the 
public relations firm Hill & Knowlton, Inc. Black Smokers 
contend that each of the defendants has unlawfully 
engaged in targeted marketing and sales of mentholated 
tobacco products to African-Americans on the basis of their 
race in violation of the civil rights statutes codified at 42 
U.S.C. SS 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1985(3). Black Smokers 
also assert a cause of action against defendants under 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents , 403 U.S. 
388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), and the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, arguing that defendants should 
be considered federal actors by virtue of the federal 
regulatory scheme to which the tobacco industry is subject. 
 
The District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. We will affirm that decision. We 
agree with the District Court that Black Smokers' 
allegations of racially targeted marketing of mentholated 
tobacco products cannot, in the absence of any disparity 
between the products sold to African-Americans and the 
products sold to others, constitute a deprivation of contract 
or property rights actionable under SS 1981 or 1982. We 
also concur with the District Court that ther e is no 
allegation that defendants are state actors to support the 
S 1983 claim and that defendants cannot be r egarded as 
federal actors as is required to maintain the claims under 
Bivens and the Fifth Amendment. Although we agree with 
the District Court that Black Smokers failed to state a 
claim under S 1985(3), we need not reach the further 
question whether SS 1981 and 1982 claims can, as a matter 
of law, support a claim under S 1985(3). As the District 
Court noted, even assuming arguendo that Black Smokers 
could properly premise a S 1985(3) cause of action on a 
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violation of SS1981 and 1982, they have failed to state a 
claim under SS 1981 and 1982. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
In their Second Amended Complaint, Black Smokers 
allege that the defendants have unlawfully tar geted African- 
Americans with billboard, magazine, and other types of 
advertising in order to promote the sale to and 
consumption by African-Americans of various mentholated 
tobacco products. It is not disputed that the tobacco 
industry has designed certain menthol cigarettes 
specifically to appeal to African-American consumers, 
including R.J. Reynolds' "Uptown," a high tar , high nicotine 
menthol cigarette.1 Black Smokers contend, and defendants 
do not dispute, that medical research has demonstrated 
that mentholated tobacco products pose gr eater health 
risks than non-mentholated ones, including an incr eased 
incidence of cancers of the lung and pharynx. It is not 
disputed that, although African-Americans account for only 
10.3% of the U.S. population, they account for a 
significantly greater share of menthol cigarette smokers. 
Black Smokers cite reports fixing the per centage of African- 
American menthol smokers at, variously, 31%, 61.5% and 
66%. Apparently relying upon the 31% figure, defendants 
claim that a significant majority (69%) of menthol cigarette 
smokers are not African-Americans and that Black 
Smokers admit that fact. In addition to the allegation of 
racially targeted marketing, Black Smokers also charge 
defendants with "intentional racial discrimination" and a 
"conspiracy of deception and misrepr esentation against the 
African American public." 
 
Black Smokers also accuse defendants of "a massive 
conspiracy to mislead the Black American public r egarding 
the safety of menthol tobacco products." Black Smokers 
identify three courses of conduct underlying the purported 
conspiracy: "(1) acting in concert to repr esent falsely that 
their menthol tobacco products are safe for African 
Americans to use; (2) engaging in a concerted campaign to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Uptown brand was withdrawn from the market by R.J. Reynolds 
in 1990 as a result of negative national publicity. 
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saturate the African American community with danger ous, 
defective and hazardous tobacco products, which Tobacco 
Industry knew caused harm, in violation of the civil and 
constitutional rights of African Americans; and (3) 
misrepresenting, suppressing, distorting, and confusing the 
truth about the health dangers of mentholated tobacco 
products." Notwithstanding these allegations, Black 
Smokers apparently concede in their opening appellate brief 
that African-Americans demonstrated their pr eference for 
menthol cigarettes before defendants initiated targeted 
advertising. In their reply brief and at oral argument, 
however, Black Smokers denied making such a concession 
and asserted that defendants created the African-American 
preference for menthol cigarettes. Black Smokers did not 
allege in their opening appellate brief that defendants 
interfere with the right of African-Americans to purchase 
non-menthol cigarettes or that menthol cigar ettes are not 
marketed and sold to persons other than African- 
Americans. However, in their reply brief and at oral 
argument, Black Smokers made the surprising statement 
that they "do not concede that Black Americans ar e free to 
purchase non-menthol cigarettes." 
 
Black Smokers do not contend that the menthol 
cigarettes marketed and sold to African-Americans are 
themselves different from those sold to whites or other 
persons. Additionally, Black Smokers do not aver that 
African-Americans receive information about menthol 
cigarettes that differs in any respect from the information 
provided to others. However, in their r eply brief and at oral 
argument, Black Smokers made another surprising claim -- 
that while defendants suggest to African-Americans in 
advertising that menthol cigarettes are healthier than non- 
menthol cigarettes, are of high quality, enhance the 
smoker's image, and are glamorous, pr estigious and 
socially acceptable, "none of these sales messages or terms 
are targeted to white consumers." Black Smokers agree, 
however, that defendants have employed tar geted marketing 
(e.g., advertising using African-American models and 
athletes) to sell non-menthol cigarettes such as Camel, 
Lucky Strike, Kent and Eve. In addition, no party to the 
instant litigation alleges that defendants pr ovide any 
consumers with warnings concerning the additional health 
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risks posed by menthol cigarettes in comparison to non- 
mentholated tobacco products. 
 
Black Smokers filed this action in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on 
October 19, 1998. A month later, Black Smokers filed a 
First Amended Class Action Complaint correcting the 
caption. By leave of the court, Black Smokers filed a 
Second Amended Complaint on December 9, 1998, in or der 
to add claims purportedly arising under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3). On January 8, 1999, defendants 
filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. 
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss on 
September 23, 1999. Jesse Brown et al. v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., et al., No. Civ. A. 98-5518, 1999 WL 783712 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 22, 1999). Black Smokers filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal on October 19, 1999. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343(a)(1), (3) and (4), and 
1332. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. We exercise plenary r eview over the District Court's 
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Gallas v. Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). We must 
accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint 
as well as the reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from them. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 
1993). We may dismiss the complaint only if it is clear that 
no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could 
be proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & 
Spaulding, 476 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 
(1984). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. REGULATING TOBACCO PRODUCTS 
 
A brief summary of the federal regulation of the tobacco 
industry is a necessary prerequisite to a discussion of 
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Black Smokers' civil rights claims. Manufactur ers of 
cigarettes are subject to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act of 1965 and its successor, the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. S 1331, et seq. 
(together, the Labeling Act). The Labeling Act provides a 
comprehensive program of federal r equirements addressing 
the labeling and advertising of cigarettes and preempts 
certain state law damages actions relating to smoking and 
health which challenge the adequacy of warnings on 
cigarette packages or the propriety of a manufacturer's 
advertising or promotion of cigarettes. See Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 511, 112 S.Ct. 2608 
(1992). In Cipollone, the Supreme Court was called upon to 
determine the contours of the federal pr eemption of state 
law actions under the Labeling Act. The Court held that (i) 
the 1965 Act does not preempt state law damages actions 
in general; (ii) the 1969 Act does preempt claims based on 
a failure to warn and on the neutralization of federally 
mandated warnings to the extent that such claims rely on 
omissions or inclusions in a manufacturer's advertising or 
promotions; and (iii) the 1969 Act does not pr eempt claims 
based on express warranty, intentional fraud and 
misrepresentation, or conspiracy. See Cipollone v. Liggett, 
505 U.S. at 530-31. 
 
B. CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS: SECTIONS 1981 AND 1982 
 
Section 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in the 
making and enforcement of contracts and pr operty 
transactions, provides: 
 
       All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 
       shall have the same right in every State and T erritory 
       to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
       evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws 
       and proceedings for the security of persons and 
       property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
       subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
       licenses and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1981(a). Section 1981 is derived from the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and from the reenactment of Section 1 
of the 1866 Act in 1870. Mahone v. Waddle , 564 F.2d 1018, 
 
                                9 
  
1030 (3d Cir. 1977), citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 168-70 & n.8; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, section 
I, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted, Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114 
SS 16, 18, 16 Stat. 144, codified at  42 U.S.C. SS 1981, 1982. 
The legislative history of the 1866 Act makes clear 
Congress's intent to enact "sweeping legislation 
implementing the thirteenth amendment to abolish all the 
remaining badges and vestiges of the slavery system." 
Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d at 1030. As a result, the 
current statute rests not only on the Fourteenth 
Amendment but also on the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
 
Section 1982, which prohibits racial discrimination in 
transactions relating to real and personal property, 
provides: 
 
       All citizens of the United States shall have the same 
       right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by 
       white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
       hold, and convey real and personal property. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1982. Like S 1981, S 1982 is a Reconstruction 
statute enacted to effectuate the aims of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Because of 
the historic interrelationship between the two statutes, 
courts have consistently construed them together . See 
Saunders v. General Services Corp., 659 F .Supp. 1042, 
1063 (E.D. Va. 1987), citing Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recreation Association, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); McCrary v. 
Runyon, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 
Although not identical, the requisite elements of claims 
under SS 1981 and 1982 are quite similar . In neither case 
need a plaintiff allege state action on the part of the 
defendant. See Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F.Supp. 119 (N.D. Ill. 
1989) (S 1982). In order to state a claim under S 1981, a 
plaintiff "must allege facts in support of the following 
elements: (1) [that plaintiff] is a member of a racial 
minority; (2) intent to discriminate on the basis of race by 
the defendant; and (3) discrimination concer ning one or 
more of the activities enumerated in the statute[,] which 
includes the right to make and enforce contracts. . . ." 
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Yelverton v. Lehman, No. Civ. A. 94-6114, 1996 WL 296551, 
at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1996), aff 'd mem., 175 F.3d 1012 
(3d Cir. 1999). In order to bring an action under S 1982, a 
plaintiff "must allege with specificity facts sufficient to show 
or raise a plausible inference of 1) the defendant's racial 
animus; (2) intentional discrimination; and 3) that the 
defendant deprived plaintiff of his rights because of race." 
Garg v. Albany Indus. Dev. Agency, 899 F . Supp. 961, 968 
(N.D.N.Y. 1995), aff 'd, 104 F.3d 351 (Table), 1996 WL 
547184 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 1996). See also Shaare Tefila 
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 616-17, 107 S.Ct. 
2019 (1987). 
 
Accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, we 
conclude that Black Smokers have not alleged a claim 
cognizable under either S 1981 or S 1982. Black Smokers do 
not make the sort of claim that is most readily actionable 
under the statute: that they have been deprived by 
defendants of the right to contract for, pur chase, own or 
use either menthol or non-menthol cigarettes. Black 
Smokers do not aver that defendants have engaged in a 
discriminatory refusal to deal with African-Americans with 
respect to either menthol or non-menthol cigar ettes. Nor do 
Black Smokers claim that defendants have dealt with 
customers on differing terms on the basis of race; Black 
Smokers concede that defendants sell menthol cigar ettes to 
African-Americans at the same price and on the same 
terms as such products are of fered to whites. Significantly, 
Black Smokers do not allege that the mentholated tobacco 
products sold to African-Americans differ from those sold to 
whites. Furthermore, at no place in their submissions do 
Black Smokers argue any disparities with r espect to the 
marketing or sales of non-menthol tobacco pr oducts on the 
basis of race. Consequently, it is difficult to understand 
Black Smokers' allegations to constitute a deprivation of 
contract or property rights actionable underSS 1981 or 
1982. Indeed, Black Smokers' complaint appears instead to 
present quite the opposite situation. Defendants are alleged 
to encourage the consumption by African-Americans of 
certain of their products: mentholated cigar ettes, snuff, and 
chewing tobacco. 
 
The question at the heart of Black Smokers' SS 1981 and 
1982 claims, then, is whether such encouragement is 
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unlawful under the civil rights statutes. At the outset, we 
note that neither party has alerted us to the existence of 
any authority standing for the proposition that an 
encouragement to deal is actionable under such statutes. 
Some authority does exist in support of the notion that 
targeting consumers for sales of defective pr oducts on the 
basis of race is actionable under SS 1981 and 1982. For 
example, in Roper v. Edwards, 815 F .2d 1474 (11th Cir. 
1987), a case cited by Black Smokers, the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit suggests that a cause of action 
under S1981 exists where a burial vault manufacturer 
made targeted sales of defective burial vaults to Black 
consumers. Although the case was brought by white 
plaintiffs who were inadvertently sold a defective vault, and 
although the Court of Appeals ultimately rejected plaintiffs' 
claims on other grounds, Black Smokers corr ectly argue 
that the Eleventh Circuit did not reject the cause of action. 
Nevertheless, Roper is readily distinguishable from the case 
at bar because unlike Roper, which involved deceptive sales 
to African-Americans of products that dif fered from those 
sold to whites, this case concerns identical products; 
defendants sell the same menthol cigarettes to everyone. 
 
One might argue that if racially directed marketing of 
menthol cigarettes resulted in a situation in which virtually 
all mentholated tobacco products were consumed by 
African-Americans and substantially all non-mentholated 
tobacco products by others, that case might come within 
the sweep of Roper. However, Black Smokers have not 
alleged such a situation. 
 
In order to salvage their S 1981 claims, Black Smokers 
resort to several alternative theories of recovery. First, they 
suggest that defendants' advertisements for menthol 
cigarettes constitute express warranties containing 
misrepresentations and false statements. This argument 
seems to constitute a claim of breach of expr ess warranty, 
intentional fraud or misrepresentation. Although it is true 
that the Labeling Act does not preempt such an action, 
Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. at 526-529, 530-31, Black 
Smokers fail to make sufficiently detailed allegations with 
respect to any of these potential causes of action. Black 
Smokers imply in their submissions, and asserted at oral 
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argument, that defendants fail to disclose the increased 
health risks of menthol cigarettes and that the African- 
American community suffers damages as a r esult of its 
higher consumption of mentholated tobacco pr oducts. 
Although that claim may be factually true, it is not 
actionable. The Supreme Court has held that the 1969 Act 
preempts claims based on a failure to war n and on the 
neutralization of federally mandated warnings to the extent 
that such claims rely on omissions or inclusions in 
advertising or promotions. Cipollone v. Liggett, 505 U.S. 
504, 530-531. 
 
Second, Black Smokers attempt to raise a claim of 
segregated market exploitation by arguing that defendants' 
practices fall within the ambit of segregated housing cases 
such as Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th 
Cir. 1973). This claim also fails on both factual and legal 
grounds. In the segregated housing cases, unlike the 
instant case, the defendants sold houses to Black 
purchasers on substantially differ ent and more onerous 
terms than to others, effectively cr eating two separate, 
racially-segregated markets. See, e.g., Clark v. Universal 
Builders, 501 F.2d at 328. Black Smokers, however, point 
to no such disparities in the sale of mentholated tobacco 
products, apart from the generalized allegation that African- 
Americans are more likely than others to buy mentholated 
tobacco products as a result of tar geted advertising. 
 
Moreover, even if Black Smokers' segr egated market 
exploitation claims were cognizable on the facts alleged, we 
must reject them on procedural grounds. It does not appear 
that Black Smokers advanced such claims in the District 
Court; arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are 
deemed to be waived and consequently are not susceptible 
of review in this Court absent exceptional cir cumstances 
(e.g., the public interest requir es that the issues be heard 
or manifest injustice would result from the failure to 
consider such issues). See, e.g., United States v. Anthony 
Dell'acquilla Enter. & Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 335 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. 
International Brotherhood of T eamsters, 55 F.3d 138, 140 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1995). No such exceptional cir cumstances are 
apparent here. 
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Third, Black Smokers assert that defendants' targeted 
marketing practices violate the "full and equal benefit" 
clause of S1981, which provides that "[a]ll persons within 
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . .." 
42 U.S.C. S 1981(a). Again, we must reject Black Smokers' 
"full and equal benefit" claims because they do not appear 
to have been raised in the District Court and no exceptional 
circumstances suggest review of such claims 
notwithstanding Black Smokers' failure to ar gue them 
previously. United States v. Anthony Dell'acquilla Enter. & 
Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d at 335 (citations omitted). Moreover, 
even if we were to consider them, such "full and equal 
benefit" claims would fail in light of a substantial line of 
authority holding that only state actors can be sued under 
the "full and equal benefit" clause of S1981. Mahone v. 
Waddle, 563 F.2d 1018, 1029 (3d Cir. 1977); Sheppard v. 
Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, 59 F.Supp.2d 27, 30 
n.1 (D.D.C. 1999) (dictum); Lewis v. J.C. Penney Co., 948 
F.Supp. 367, 371 (D.Del. 1996) (citations omitted); Sterling 
v. Kazmierczak, 983 F.Supp. 1186, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1997). As 
we explain in Sections III C and D, infra, the defendants in 
the instant case cannot be regarded as federal or state 
actors. 
 
Notwithstanding Black Smokers' arguments to the 
contrary, their complaints essentially constitute 
discriminatory advertising claims. Black Smokers virtually 
admit as much when they characterize their claims as 
allegations of discriminatory targeting in sales of allegedly 
defective products. Although Black Smokers ar gue that 
their claims resemble racial profiling and racially-motivated 
prepayment cases, all such fact patterns are 
distinguishable from the instant case because they involve 
either a naked, racially-motivated restriction on dealing or 
a race-based variation of the terms of the contract at issue. 
Consequently, Black Smokers' claims remain 
fundamentally allegations of discriminatory advertising and 
are not therefore cognizable underSS 1981 or 1982. 
 
Even in the context of housing discrimination -- arguably 
a paradigmatic example of the rights Congress sought to 
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protect under the Civil Rights Acts -- ample authority 
exists in support of the proposition that discriminatory 
advertising is not actionable under SS 1981 and 1982. See 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413, 88 S.Ct. 
2186 (1968) (noting that S1982 does not pr ohibit 
"advertising or other representations that indicate 
discriminatory preferences"); Span v. Colonial Village, Inc., 
899 F.2d 24, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that SS 1981 and 
1982 do not prohibit real estate advertisements indicating 
discriminatory preferences); Saunders v. General Services 
Corp., 659 F.Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1987) (declining to apply 
SS 1981 or 1982 to racially discriminatory advertising for 
rental housing); Ragin v. Steiner, Clateman and Assocs., 
714 F.Supp. 709, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same in context of 
cooperative apartment complex). 
 
C. SECTION 1983 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 provides a cause of action against any 
"person who, under color of any statute, or dinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or T erritory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected" any person to the deprivation of any right 
protected by federal law or the United States Constitution. 
Unlike SS 1981 and 1982, S 1983 is derived from the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, which was enacted to enfor ce the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Mahone v. Waddle , 564 F.2d 1018, 
1031 (3d Cir. 1977). Moreover, the Act of 1871, unlike the 
Act of 1866, is addressed only to the state and to those 
acting under color of state authority. Id. (citations omitted). 
It is well established that liability under S 1983 will not 
attach for actions taken under color of federal law. Bethea 
v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1164 (3d Cir . 1971). In light of the 
fact that Black Smokers have not alleged that defendants 
are state, rather than federal actors, the District Court 
properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss as to Black 
Smokers' S 1983 claims. 
 
D. THE BIVENS AND FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
 
The controlling question with respect to Black Smokers' 
claims under Bivens, supra, and the federal Constitution is 
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whether defendant tobacco companies should be r egarded 
as federal actors. In Bivens, the Supr eme Court found that 
a damages claim arose under the federal Constitution 
where a federal agent acting under color of federal authority 
violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. A Bivens action, which 
is the federal equivalent of the S 1983 cause of action 
against state actors, will lie where the defendant has 
violated the plaintiff 's rights under color of federal law. 
Alexander v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Banking, No. Civ. 93- 
5510, 1994 WL 144305, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 21, 1994). 
Black Smokers also make "direct constitutional" claims 
under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. As the 
District Court noted in its opinion, the Fourteenth 
Amendment only applies to actions of the states and not to 
the federal government; therefore, the District Court 
properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss the 
Fourteenth Amendment claims. For Black Smokers' Bivens 
and Fifth Amendment claims to succeed, Black Smokers 
must establish that defendants are federal actors. Because 
defendants' conduct cannot properly be r egarded as federal, 
these claims must fail. 
 
In order to determine whether the conduct of a private 
party should be attributed to the federal gover nment, 
courts apply the "state action" analysis set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 
937-42, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (1982). The Supreme Court 
succinctly summarized the two-part test of Lugar  in its 
decision in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614, 
620, 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991). There, the Court stated that 
Lugar requires courts to ask "first whether the claimed 
constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a 
right or privilege having its source in [federal] authority . . . 
and second, whether the private party charged with the 
deprivation could be described in all fairness as a [federal] 
actor." Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. at 620 (applying Lugar) 
(citations omitted). Citing American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977 (1999), Black Smokers 
argue that their claims satisfy the first pr ong of Lugar 
insofar as defendants had acted "with knowledge of and 
pursuant to" the statute in question: the Labeling Act. This 
argument is unavailing because it fails to allege a 
deprivation of a right protected by the Constitution. 
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Moreover, the averment that defendants should be 
subject to the mandates of the Constitution because their 
activities have been allegedly approved by the federal 
government through defendants' compliance with the 
Labeling Act is unconvincing. The mere fact that a tobacco 
company has complied with the requirements of a federal 
law cannot suffice to transform it into a federal actor any 
more than the compliance of a myriad of private enterprises 
with federal law and administrative regulations could of 
itself work such a transformation.2  Additionally, because 
the alleged wrongdoing (the targeted advertising of 
mentholated tobacco products to African-Americans) is not 
required by the Labeling Act, it is difficult to view such 
targeted advertising as federal action by defendants which 
can serve as the basis for a Bivens action. 
 
The second requirement of the Lugar  analysis -- that the 
private party could in all fairness be r egarded as a federal 
actor -- may be met under one of three interr elated theories 
of government action: (i) the "public function" test, (ii) the 
"close nexus" test and (iii) the "symbiotic relationship" test. 
In addition, Black Smokers discern in case law a fourth, 
more synthetic "totality of the circumstances" test, the 
existence of which is doubtful, as we explain infra. In order 
to determine which test should be applied to a given set of 
facts, courts must investigate carefully the circumstances 
of each case. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856 (1961); Community Med. 
Center v. Emergency Med. Services, 712 F .2d 878, 880 (3d. 
Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). Regar dless of what test is 
ultimately applied, the object of the inquiry is to determine 
whether a private entity has exercised powers traditionally 
reserved exclusively to the government, Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352, 95 S.Ct. 449 
(1974), or whether "the defendant exercised power 
possessed by virtue of [federal] law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed in the authority of 
[federal] law." Groman v. T ownship of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 
628, 639 n.17 (3d. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
 
The gravamen of the "public function" test is whether the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See our discussion of the "public function" test in this Section, 
infra. 
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government is effectively using the private entity in 
question to avoid a constitutional obligation or to engage in 
activities reserved to the government. See Goussis v. 
Kimball, 813 F.Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1993). We cannot 
agree with Black Smokers' assertion that defendants' 
actions satisfy the "public function" test. The "public 
function" test is the most rigorous of the inquiries. In Blum 
v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004-5, the Supreme Court 
stressed that the traditionally public function must be the 
"exclusive prerogative of the [gover nment]," id. (citation 
omitted). Courts generally emphasize this "exclusivity" 
requirement and thus seldom find that high standard to 
have been satisfied. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 
1137, 1142 (3d. Cir. 1995). Even in cases involving 
arguably semi-public functions, such as pr oviding utility 
services, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, or 
furnishing remedial education to high school students, see 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S.Ct. 2764 
(1982), the Supreme Court has declined to characterize 
such activities as government functions for purposes of the 
public function analysis. 
 
In the case at bar, the action complained of is the lawful 
sale and marketing of a legal, albeit federally r egulated, 
consumer product: a private rather than public, and a 
fortiori not "exclusively" public, function. Even if the 
activities at issue extended, as Black Smokers suggest, 
beyond the mere marketing and sale of mentholated 
tobacco products to the testing and labeling of such 
products, Black Smokers' argument would fail because it 
would not meet the exclusivity requirement under the 
public function test. Given that many products, including 
mentholated tobacco, are tested, marketed and labeled by 
their manufacturers, often in accordance with applicable 
regulatory requirements, such activities cannot be 
characterized as the exclusive prerogative of the 
government. As the District Court noted, it is simply 
inaccurate to suggest that the testing, labeling and 
marketing of cigarettes is the exclusive pr ovince of the 
federal government. Finally, Black Smokers' averment that 
defendants' compliance with various federal labeling 
requirements transforms defendants into government 
actors is without support in applicable case law. Such 
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propositions have been flatly rejected by the Supreme Court 
on several occasions; see American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. 
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); Blum v. Y aretsky, 457 U.S. at 
1004; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co ., 419 U.S. 345, 
350 (1974) (holding that the fact that a business is subject 
to government regulation does not by itself convert the 
business's action into that of the government). 
 
Black Smokers' allegations that defendants' actions 
satisfy the "close nexus" test under the gover nment action 
analysis are also unavailing. As with the public function 
analysis, Black Smokers apparently discer n the purported 
nexus between the private action complained of and the 
federal government in the operation of the Labeling Act. 
They assert that the Labeling Act encourages tobacco 
manufacturers to conceal the dangers of mentholated 
cigarettes, mandates inadequate warnings on such 
products and preempts most tort actions against 
defendants. However, because the Labeling Act does not 
compel, influence or encourage the actions upon which this 
suit is based -- the targeted marketing of menthol 
cigarettes to African-Americans -- but rather only requires 
the disclosure of certain risks on tobacco pr oduct 
packaging, defendants' conduct in compliance with the 
Labeling Act does not create the "close nexus" necessary for 
a finding of state action. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 
U.S. 830 (1982); American Mfrs. Mut. Inc. Co. v. Sullivan, 
526 U.S. at 52; Goussis v. Kimball, 813 F .Supp. at 357. 
Additionally, Black Smokers' "close nexus" ar gument is 
defective to the extent that it does not allege the violation 
of a federal right, a prerequisite under that analysis. See 
Goussis v. Kimball, 813 F.Supp. at 357. 
 
Black Smokers' attempt to classify this case under the 
"symbiotic relationship" category of state action cases is 
similarly tenuous. In the seminal, albeit somewhat 
idiosyncratic, case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 
supra, the Supreme Court held that a cof fee shop, which 
leased property located in a government owned parking 
garage, was integrated with the parking facility as an 
organic part of the government operation and was party to 
a mutually beneficial relationship with the government. Out 
of these facts arose the "symbiotic r elationship test," which 
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asks whether the government has "insinuated itself into a 
position of interdependence" with the defendant. Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 725. 
 
Black Smokers' allegations concerning defendants' 
relationship with the federal government prove both too 
little and too much; and in any case, they scar cely suffice 
to make out a "symbiotic relationship" within the meaning 
of Burton. Black Smokers aver that (i) the government 
benefits from its relationship with defendants by virtue of 
collecting "enormous tax revenues" from the tobacco 
industry and (ii) the interests of the gover nment and 
defendants are "explicitly intertwined" under the terms of 
the Labeling Act, id. While these aver ments are 
undoubtedly true, they are inadequate to demonstrate 
government action. Virtually all enterprises are subject to 
tax collection and, to varying degrees, to r egimes of 
administrative regulation; were these attributes sufficient to 
satisfy the test of Burton, substantially all businesses in the 
country would effectively become federal actors. See 
Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 918 F .2d 1079, 1082 (2d 
Cir. 1990). Moreover, although Burton retains much of its 
precedential value, it should be noted that the Supreme 
Court has recently cast some degree of doubt upon that 
decision. In American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 
which reversed our finding that certain private insurance 
companies were to be regarded as state actors under 
Burton, the Supreme Court noted that " Burton was one of 
our early cases dealing with `state action' under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and later cases have r efined the 
vague `joint participation' test embodied in that case." Id., 
526 U.S. at 57 (citations omitted).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We recently applied the doctrine of Burton, as refined by the Supreme 
Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965 
(1972), in Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment Inc., No. 00-5178, ___ 
F.3d ___ (2001). The instant case is distinguishable from Crissman 
because in the latter case, which involved state-licensed harness racing 
and related gambling activities, state involvement extended far beyond 
regulation and revenue collection. In Crissman, the harness racing 
operator functioned as the state's agent with r espect to video lottery 
operations and was obligated to enforce a state statute relating to 
harness racing. See Crissman, ___ F.3d at ___ - ___ [Section III]. Such an 
agency relationship coupled with law enfor cement authority confers 
upon the operator attributes of government sovereignty wholly absent in 
the federal government's regulation of tobacco manufacturers. 
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Finally, Black Smokers contend that an expansive, fact- 
oriented "totality of the circumstances" approach to the 
question of government action exists wholly apart from the 
three inquiries discussed supra and that such an approach 
is grounded in Third Circuit cases such as Sullivan v. 
Barnett, 139 F.3d 158 (3d Cir . 1998), rev'd 526 U.S. 40 
(1999), and Mark v. Borough of Hatbor o, 151 F.3d 1137 (3d. 
Cir. 1995). Although our cases place "the factual context in 
which the case arises," Sullivan v. Bar nett, 139 F.3d at 170, 
at the heart of the government action analysis, such 
emphasis constitutes no more than proper adherence to the 
methodology set forth in the government action cases 
discussed supra and consequently cannot be said to 
represent a novel development in or distinct branch of 
government action doctrine. 
 
Purporting to use this asserted "totality of the 
circumstances" test as the basis of their r emaining 
government action analysis, Black Smokers compare the 
instant case to Edmonson v. Leesville Concr ete, 500 U.S. 
614 (1991). Leaving aside the question whether the federal 
courts have ever explicitly recognized Black Smokers' 
"totality of the circumstances" appr oach, the facts of the 
instant case are readily distinguishable from those of 
Edmonson. In Edmonson, the Supreme Court held that 
lawyers' use of peremptory challenges was pursuant to a 
course of government action and consequently that any 
racially discriminatory use of such challenges violates 
jurors' equal protection rights. Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete, 500 U.S. at 622-23. The sine qua non of the 
Court's decision in Edmonson was the pr esence of 
government involvement so pervasive in the context of the 
challenged actions as to render such actions virtually 
inseparable from the participation of the gover nment. The 
Edmonson Court therefore emphasized that peremptory 
challenges "simply could not exist" without the 
government's "significant participation." Id. at 622. The 
Court went on to characterize the jury as "a quintessential 
government body, having no attributes of a private actor," 
id. at 624, and to note that peremptory challenges are 
performed in the context of an inar guably "traditional 
government function": trial by jury. Id . By contrast, in the 
instant case, the federal government does not in any 
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manner design, mandate or approve the alleged racially 
targeted advertising of which Black Smokers complain, 
notwithstanding the fact that such advertising is subject to 
certain requirements and restrictions set forth in the 
Labeling Act. Black Smokers' insistence at oral ar gument 
that the preemption of certain categories of tort actions by 
the Labeling Act in some way constitutes the exer cise of a 
traditional government function or significant governmental 
participation within the meaning of Edmonson is also 
without support in applicable precedent; indeed, such 
preemption provisions are commonplace in federal product 
safety and information disclosure legislation. See, e.g., 
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. 1261 et seq., 
note (b)(1)(A); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F .2d 736, 739-41 
(4th Cir. 1993) (construing preemption provision of Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act). Moreover , the marketing and 
advertising practices of defendants, including their research 
and safety testing activities, are functions typical of various 
private enterprises and, even in light of the federal 
regulation to which such activities are subject under the 
Labeling Act and other legislation, are difficult to regard as 
"traditional government function[s]" within the meaning of 
Edmonson. 
 
E. SECTION 1985(3) CLAIM 
 
Black Smokers' 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3) claims ar e deficient 
in several respects and consequently may be disposed of 
relatively quickly. Section 1985(3) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
 
       If two or more persons in any State or T erritory 
       conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the 
       premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, 
       either directly or indirectly, any person or class of 
       persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
       privileges and immunities under the laws; . . .[and] in 
       any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one 
       or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be 
       done, any act in furtherance of the object of such 
       conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or 
       property, or deprived of having and exer cising any right 
       or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party 
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       so injured or deprived may have an action for r ecovery 
       of the damages, occasioned by such injury or 
       deprivation, against any one or more of the 
       conspirators. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1985(3). In general, the conspiracy provision of 
S 1985(3) provides a cause of action under rather limited 
circumstances against both private and state actors. In 
order successfully to bring an action underS 1985(3) for 
private conspiracy, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, "(a) 
that a racial or other class-based invidious discriminatory 
animus lay behind the coconspirators' actions, (b) that the 
coconspirators intended to deprive the victim of a right 
guaranteed by the Constitution against private impairment, 
and (c) that that right was consciously targeted and not 
just incidentally affected." Spencer v. Casavila, 44 F.3d 74, 
77 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also Tilton v. 
Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
the same elements are required forS1985(3) claims against 
private actors). In order to prevent the use of S1985(3) as a 
general federal tort law, courts have been car eful to limit 
causes of action thereunder to conspiracies that deprive 
persons of constitutionally protected rights, privileges and 
immunities "that are protected against private, as well as 
official encroachment." Libertad v. W elch, 53 F.3d 428, 446- 
50 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 
It is well established that S 1985(3) does not itself create 
any substantive rights; rather, it serves only as a vehicle for 
vindicating federal rights and privileges which have been 
defined elsewhere. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376, 99 S.Ct. 2345 (1979). 
Moreover, in the context of actions br ought against private 
conspirators, the Supreme Court has thus far r ecognized 
only two rights protected under S 1985(3): the right to be 
free from involuntary servitude and the right to interstate 
travel. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 
U.S. 263, 278, 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993); Caswell v. The 
Morning Call, Inc., No. Civ. A. 95-7081, 1996 WL 560355, 
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1996); Welch v. Board of Dirs. of 
Wildwood Golf Club, 877 F.Supp. 955, 959 (W.D. Pa. 1995). 
 
The instant case is distinguishable from the cases cited 
above because Black Smokers assert the deprivation of a 
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different type of rights: those of pr operty and contract. 
Additionally, the District Court correctly observed that 
because such rights -- which entail freedom from 
discrimination by a private actor -- are statutorily enacted, 
rather than of purely constitutional pr ovenance, they 
cannot be vindicated under S 1985(3). 
 
Black Smokers attempt to salvage their S 1985(3) claims 
by arguing that defendants' alleged violations of SS 1981 
and 1982 may support a claim under S 1985(3). In light of 
the overwhelming preponderance of authority on the 
question, this argument, too, must fail. Contrary to Black 
Smokers' claims, Bray does not support the proposition 
that SS 1981 or 1982 claims can form the basis of a 
S 1985(3) claim or the notion that the contract and property 
rights protected by SS 1981 and 1982 fall within the 
category of "involuntary servitude" violations that may 
support a S 1985(3) claim. Isolated authority from the 
District Court for the District of Columbia does exist in 
support of the theory that a S 1985(3) claim may be based 
on a S 1981 claim. See Johnson v. Gr eater Southeast 
Community Hospital Corp., 903 F.Supp. 140, 153-154, citing 
Alder v. Columbia Historical Society, 690 F .Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 
1988); Thompson v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists , 580 F.Supp. 
662 (D.D.C. 1984). The great weight of pr ecedential 
authority, however, supports the traditional limitation of 
S 1985(3) to questions of interstate travel and involuntary 
servitude and does not suggest that SS 1981 or 1982 claims 
in general may form the basis of a S 1985(3) action. See, 
e.g., Sanders v. Prentice-Hall Corp. , 178 F.3d. 1296 (Table), 
1999 WL 115517, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 1999); Libertad v. 
Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 447 n.15 (1st Cir. 1995); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993). We need not, 
however, resolve the question whether violations of SS 1981 
and 1982 can support a S 1985(3) claim because Black 
Smokers have failed to state a claim under eitherS 1981 or 
S 1982.4 The District Court therefore correctly dismissed 
Black Smokers' claims under S1985(3). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See Section III B, supra. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m the decision of 
the District Court in all respects. The District Court 
correctly held that Black Smokers' claims of racially 
targeted advertising and marketing of mentholated tobacco 
products were inadequate to state a cause of action under 
42 U.S.C. SS 1981 and 1982. Because Black Smokers do 
not demonstrate that defendants should be regar ded as 
state actors, the District Court properly dismissed their 
claims under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 as well. Finally, we will 
affirm the District Court's conclusion that Black Smokers 
fail to allege adequately that defendants ar e federal actors 
for purposes of claims asserted either pursuant to Bivens or 
directly under the federal Constitution and that they fail to 
state a cause of action under S 1985(3). 
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SHADUR, District Judge, Dissenting in part: 
 
What has been said in the majority opinion may pr operly 
be viewed as having put forth the best possible case for 
affirmance of the District Court's dismissal of the Black 
Smokers' Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint"). But 
that presentation, I believe, has despite itself highlighted 
the basic flaws in such a threshold Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 
12(b)(6) dismissal. Accordingly I dissent fr om the portion of 
the majority opinion that rejects Black Smokers' claims 
under Sections 1981, 1982 and 1985(3) at the thr eshold of 
the case.1 
 
Both the panel majority and I necessarily pr oceed from 
the seminal statement in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 
U.S. 69, 73 (1984) of the quite undemanding bur den that 
Rule 12(b)(6) imposes on a plaintiff 's complaint: 
 
       A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that 
       no relief could be granted under any set of facts that 
       could be proved consistent with the allegations. Conley 
       v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
 
And the majority opinion also correctly r ecognizes, though 
I fear it does not fairly apply, the proposition that all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn fr om the 
allegations in the Complaint, as well as the allegations 
themselves, must be accepted as true (Moor e v. Tartler, 986 
F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 
Because we deal with a Complaint whose allegations 
must thus be credited, there is no need to dwell at length 
on the appalling record disclosed by Black Smokers' 
pleading. Their 110-page 211-paragraph Complaint does 
not comport with the Rule 8(a)(2) requir ement of "a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because I agree that there is no pr edicate for ascribing state actor 
or 
federal actor status to the tobacco companies or the other defendants, I 
concur in the majority's rejection of Black Smokers' claims under Section 
1983 and under the Bivens line of authority. And while speaking of the 
other defendants, to simplify the ensuing discussion I will refer solely 
to 
the defendant tobacco companies, for in my view any sorting out among 
the defendants ought to be done by the district court on remand in light 
of what is said here. 
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is entitled to relief," but they can scar cely be faulted for 
what would normally be viewed as overkill in light of the 
undue judicial skepticism with which their ef fort has been 
met. It is sufficient for present purposes to refer to the 
substantially higher carcinogenic effects of the tobacco 
companies' mentholated products, the use of which an 
extensively quoted 1998 Surgeon General's r eport and other 
medical research discloses as having led to a much higher 
rate of lung cancer, pharyngeal cancer and other 
malignancies among Blacks (Complaint PP80-91), 
phenomena that had been confirmed by the tobacco 
companies' own significant research (which the companies 
had suppressed). And the Complaint further alleges that 
despite that knowledge, the companies nevertheless 
engaged in extensive conduct that adversely impacted on 
Black Smokers (id. PP48, 63), even including the actual 
design and introduction (though it was then abandoned in 
the face of public outrage) of a mentholated pr oduct 
expressly for Blacks (id. P45.c). 
 
In that light, where I first part company with the majority 
opinion is in its having ruled as a matter of law "that Black 
Smokers' allegations of racially targeted marketing of 
mentholated tobacco products cannot, in the absence of 
any disparity between the products sold to African- 
Americans and the products sold to others, constitute a 
deprivation of contract or property rights actionable under 
SS1981 or 1982." And my departure fr om that 
unsupportable proposition flows directly from the straw 
man first erected by the majority opinion when it says: 
 
       Black Smokers do not make the sort of claim that is 
       most readily actionable under the statute: that they 
       have been deprived by defendants of the right to 
       contract for, purchase, own or use either menthol or 
       non-menthol cigarettes. 
 
What must be understood instead is that both Section 
1981 and Section 1982 are not at all limited by their terms 
to the outright deprivation of the Black community's right 
to contract. Instead each of those statutes mandates an 
equal playing field that is violated by conduct that imposes 
different and race-discriminatory conditions (however 
created) on the exercise of seemingly comparable 
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contractual rights: Section 1981 guarantees to Black 
Smokers "the same right . . . to make . .. contracts . . . as 
is enjoyed by white citizens," while Section 1982 assures to 
Black Smokers "the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens . . . to . . . purchase . . . personal property." And 
that is the gravamen of the Complaint--that by the tobacco 
companies' deliberate and successful targeting of Black 
Smokers to persuade them to purchase and smoke the 
concededly more dangerous menthol cigar ettes and 
smokeless tobacco--conduct whose actionability is akin to 
the prohibition of actual "steering" under the Fair Housing 
Act--those companies have impaired that equality of rights. 
 
Nor should it avail the tobacco companies to attempt to 
trot out "freedom of contract" principles. On the 
uncontested allegations of the Complaint, they have 
deliberately suppressed the added perils cr eated by the 
mentholated products, concealing them fr om Black 
Smokers. And it just will not do for the tobacco companies 
to argue that they are somehow equal opportunity deceivers 
--that they have betrayed Whites and Blacks alike by their 
deception. When their alleged concealment of the known 
risks (known to them, that is) is coupled with their express 
efforts to maximize the sales of mentholated coffin nails 
and mentholated smokeless tobacco to Blacks, the 
inequality of treatment forbidden by Sections 1981 and 
1982 is demonstrated by the fairly-read Complaint. 
 
And this is not at all speculative. Defendants' r epeated 
(and it must be said hypocritical) emphasis on the fact that 
69% of the mentholated products are used by non-Blacks 
is as deceptive as their historical conduct of denying the 
extraordinarily harmful effects of nicotine generally and of 
menthol in particular. What that repeated emphasis glosses 
over is the enormous disparity between the 10+% of the 
population represented by Blacks and the Black Smokers' 
31%2 consumption of the menthol cigarettes. It will be 
recalled that the rule of thumb for demonstrating 
discrimination has been recognized in these ter ms for a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As the majority opinion indicates, 31% is the most charitable (to the 
tobacco companies) of the numbers reflected by statistics cited in the 
Complaint. Other studies put that number as high as 61.5% and 66%. 
 
                                28 
  
quarter century (Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 483, 496- 
97 n.17 (1976)): 
 
       As a general rule for such large samples, if the 
       difference between the expected value and the observed 
       number is more than 2 or 3 standard deviations, then 
       the hypothesis that the difference was random will be 
       suspect to a social scientist. 
 
Two standard deviations equate to a 5% likelihood of 
chance distribution. And by contrast the probability that a 
10% versus 31% disparity is a matter of mere chance 
represents, as an approximation (and essentially a 
conservative one) of the normal distribution, some 7 
standard deviations--producing a figur e so small as to 
beggar the imagination: 1.28 in a trillion. 3 
 
That extraordinary imbalance (truly an understatement, 
for such a huge disparity is almost beyond human 
comprehension) really cuts the legs out fr om under the 
majority opinion's attempt to distinguish the decision in 
Roper v. Edwards, 815 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1987) by 
stating: 
 
       One might argue that if racially directed marketing of 
       menthol cigarettes resulted in a situation in which 
       virtually all mentholated tobacco products wer e 
       consumed by African-Americans and substantially all 
       non-mentholated tobacco products by others, that case 
       might come within the sweep of Roper. However, Black 
       Smokers have not alleged such a situation. 
 
In real world terms there is no conceptual difference 
between the notion that "virtually all mentholated tobacco 
products were consumed by African-Americans" and the 
situation in which that group's comparative consumption is 
so close to 100% of total consumption in the meaningful 
statistical sense. 
 
It is surely unreasonable to ascribe such an enormous 
disparity to chance rather than to the purposeful steering 
that has been alleged by Black Smokers--at a minimum, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. That figure is derived from William Knight, Tables of the Normal 
Distribution, at http://www.math.unb.ca/~knight/utility/NormTble.htm. 
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they should be allowed their day in court to pr ove that 
racial animus may reasonably be inferred from the tobacco 
companies' deliberate targeting of African-Americans as 
their far-preferred targets of the more dangerous products 
at issue. There is no question that even the far, far smaller 
but still statistically significant disparity of two standard 
deviations suffices to warrant an inference of intentional 
discrimination--see, e.g., such cases as Smith v. Xerox 
Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 365-66 (2d Cir . 1999). 
 
Nor I suggest will it do (as the tobacco companies have 
urged and as the majority opinion has cr edited) to say that 
Black Smokers cannot complain about that deliberate 
steering because Blacks were already pr edisposed to prefer 
the mentholated products. We are after all dealing with the 
case at its very outset. Nothing has been shown--because 
no opportunity has been given to Black Smokers--as to 
whether that preference was itself the pr oduct of the same 
kind of improper steering at the outset, or even if not, as to 
whether the earlier preference even began to approach (let 
alone to account for) the enormous disparity that now 
exists (a showing that might for example be accomplished, 
again to deal with statistical probabilities, through the 
application of multiple regression analysis). 
 
In response to Black Smokers' uncontroverted allegations 
about the tobacco companies' purposeful steering of their 
known extra-harmful mentholated products to the African- 
American market, the majority opinion accepts the 
argument that this was no more than conventional 
advertising, something that Jones v. Alfr ed H. Mayer Co., 
392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) characterized as nonactionable 
under Section 1982. But Jones v. Mayer, id. said only this 
in the course of announcing for the first time that Section 
1982 applies to private as well as public racial 
discrimination in the sale of property (a statement made in 
the course of contrasting that statute with the full-bore 
open housing law that was then brand new on the books): 
 
       It [Section 1982] does not prohibit advertising or 
       other representations that indicate discriminatory 
       preferences. 
 
That sanitization of mere statements of discriminatory 
preferences does not control her e, however, for when such 
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discriminatory preferences are translated into 
discriminatory action, as is alleged her e (and as we must 
credit), the actor cannot fairly be insulated from the impact 
of Section 1982 (or of Section 1981) by asserting that its 
advertising was a means by which it accomplished that 
forbidden end. 
 
Indeed, that is precisely the thrust of the eloquent 
opinion by the late Judge Luther Swygert in Clark v. 
Universal Builders, 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir . 1974), which 
found support rather than a lack of support in Jones v. 
Mayer, but which the majority opinion seeks to distinguish 
because the sales of housing to Black purchasers in Clark 
were on more onerous terms than the sales to non-Blacks. 
But once again I suggest that the attempted distinction is 
hollow--that defendants' conduct set out in the Complaint 
in this case effectively created the same type of separate, 
racially-segregated market as was found actionable in 
Clark. Such cases as Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 
F.2d 1521, 1525, 1529 (7th Cir. 1990) teach that racial 
steering is forbidden both by Section 1982 and by the Fair 
Housing Act (each of which was implicated ther e)--and of 
course Section 1982 is not limited to anti-Black 
discrimination in housing, as is the Fair Housing Act.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Even brief reflection on what Jones v. Mayer did not say, as well as on 
what it did say, demonstrates that the majority opinion loads that 
opinion's single sentence quoted above with mor e baggage than it can 
reasonably carry. Just as there is nothing actionable (for example) in the 
seller of clothing deciding that it wishes to expand its market by 
depicting Black as well as White models in its clothing ads, so too a 
mere indication of racial preferences in advertising is not actionable as 
such under Section 1982. But what I believe is just as obviously 
prohibited by that statute is using such advertising to deny Blacks the 
same treatment as Whites--the rights to contract and to purchase under 
the same conditions--by deliberately subjecting Blacks to the far greater 
impact of the seriously (often fatally) deleterious effects of the 
advertised 
product--effects well known to but undisclosed by the tobacco 
companies. And as for the majority opinion's ef fort to distinguish Clark 
v. Universal Builders, it is necessarily appar ent (though it was 
undiscussed because not placed into issue ther e) that the Black 
purchasers in that case were the victims of sales of substandard housing 
--in violation of Section 1982--that had to be accomplished through 
advertising. After all, the alternative pr emise of assuming that those 
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Finally, what of the required showing of racial animus? Is 
it a defense for the tobacco companies to ur ge that their 
pattern of general concealment and deception r eflected 
nothing more than a free market desir e to make profit, and 
that their targeting of Black Smokers was nothing more 
than a desire to maximize those profits because the Blacks 
were most vulnerable to the most deleterious pr oducts? 
Again, unlawfully discriminatory intent under the 
discrimination laws generally has been recognized as 
reasonably inferable from far less evidence of disparate 
impact--should any different principle apply here? Once 
more the tobacco companies' callous indif ference to 
smokers' health has been demonstrably more marked 
toward Black Smokers--that is the combined ef fect (1) of 
the tobacco companies' knowledge (and their concealment 
of that knowledge) about the special deadliness of the 
mentholated products that they have been marketing and 
(2) of their express targeting of those products toward the 
African-American community. 
 
It is not of course my purpose to express any conclusion 
as to the existence or nonexistence of the pr ohibited intent. 
Instead the focus of this opinion is to stress the 
requirement that, as with all other factual issues, intent 
must be resolved by a factfinding jury (or perhaps by a 
judge in the summary judgment context of Rule 56, rather 
than at the preliminary pleading stage under Rule 12(b)(6), 
where plaintiffs' allegations must be accepted as true). And 
to that end I find it particularly poignant that we deal here 
with a group of defendants whose industry is centered in 
an area where Blacks were once chattels, viewed as 
subhuman--again ironically in terms of the present 
litigation, chattels whose slave labor was r esponsible in 
large part for the economic success of the tobacco industry. 
Even though a century and a half has elapsed since that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
sales were spontaneously generated would r equire turning the aphorism 
credited to Emerson on its head to read: 
 
       If a man can make a worse mouse-trap than his neighbor, though 
       he builds his house in the woods the world will make a beaten path 
       to his door. 
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mindset was supposed to have been eliminated by the Civil 
War and by the post-War Civil Rights Acts (including 
Sections 1981 and 1982), all of us know that the r eality of 
racial prejudice has unfortunately long outlived the theory 
embodied in those statutes. Whether any such pr ejudice 
has been at work here should not, I believe, be resolved on 
a threshold determination of the likelihood or unlikelihood 
of Black Smokers' ability to prove their allegations in that 
respect. 
 
We would do well to remember what Justice O'Connor 
(speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court on this issue) 
said in rejecting the threshold dismissal of a pro se 
prisoner's complaint because of a judicial view that its 
allegations were unlikely (Denton v. Her nandez, 504 U.S. 
25, 33 (1992)): 
 
       Some improbable allegations might properly be 
       disposed of on summary judgment, but to dismiss 
       them as frivolous without any factual development is to 
       disregard the age-old insight that many allegations 
       might be "strange, but true; for truth is always strange, 
       Stranger than fiction." Lord Byron, Don Juan, canto 
       XIV, stanza 101 (T. Steffan, E. Steffan, & W. Pratt eds. 
       1977). 
 
Black Smokers are surely entitled to no less, where their 
factual assertions are so solidly supported (and not in the 
least fanciful), and where the perceived problems with their 
Complaint really represent skepticism as to their ability to 
prove causation and intent--classic issues of fact to be 
resolved by a factfinding jury and not by judicial 
prescreening. 
 
In sum, I suggest that cutting Black Smokers of f before 
they have had the opportunity to demonstrate that they can 
deliver as advertised5 in their Complaint does violence to 
the fundamental principles of judicial reading of 
complaints, as acknowledged both in the majority opinion 
and in this dissent. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in 
the respects spoken of here. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Admittedly a bad pun. 
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